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MISUSE OF SEPARATION OF
POWERS THEORY IN CASES




THOMAS EMERSON, in his seminal work, The System of Free-
dom of Expression,I argues that the normal rules of free expres-
sion do not apply to "certain aspects of the operations of the
military, of commercial activities, of the activities of children, and
of communication with foreign countries."2 Even so, Professor
Emerson acknowledges that "[t]his does not mean that the First
Amendment has no application in these sectors . . . [but merely
that] the functions of expression.., in such areas are different from
those in the main system, and that different legal rules may there-
fore be required."3 Consequently, while Emerson might agree that
in the name of preserving military discipline the Court could justifi-
ably prohibit a serviceman from wearing a yarmulke while on duty,4
his reasoning could never be extended to support the constitutional-
ity of the military's requiring adherence to any particular religion
whatever military authorities might say (or even prove) about how
religious diversity might disrupt the effectiveness of a military fight-
ing force.5
* Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, Case Western Reserve
University School of Law; B.S. (1962); J.D. (1965) Northwestern University. I wish to thank
my colleagues Jonathan Entin and William Marshall for their helpful and thought provoking
comments. In addition, I wish to thank my research assistants Ms. Dana Underwood (Class
of 1987) and Mr. Brian Ross (Class of 1988) who, at different times and for different pur-
poses, assisted in gathering materials germane to this paper.
1. T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION (1970).
2. Id. at 19-20.
3. Id. at 20 (emphasis added).
4. See Goldman v. Weinberger, 106 S. Ct. 1310, 1314 (1986). The specific result in
Goldman was overturned by Congress in 1987. See National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989, Pub. L. No. 100-180, 101 Stat. 1019 (1987).
5. Emerson would probably agree with Justice Blackmun in such a case: "Except as
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Ordinarily whether particular speech activities6 fall inside or
outside "the system of freedom of expression" is determined ac-
cording to whether the speech, or the institutional context in which
it occurs, is hospitable to first amendment values. In other words,
we view the question solely through the eyes of the first amendment.
Thus the military, while often the center of political controversy, is
an institution governed internally by principles of hierarchical disci-
pline and obedience to authority,7 which are the antithesis of the
open and robust debate, socratic search for the truth, and self-fulfill-
ment rationales of the first amendment.8 The same can be said of
the prison system where notions of individual self-fulfillment,
heated debate about the great political issues of our day, and even
certain religious practices must take a backseat to the necessities of
individual and collective security.9
Emerson's assertion that certain institutional settings will not
tolerate full adherence to the first amendment is, I think, correct.
So too is the means by which he decides which systems are deserv-
ing of full protection and which are not. But the Court has recently
suggested a different set of reasons for giving less than full protec-
tion to speech in certain settings, reasons related not to first amend-
ment values but to structural values. For example in Bell v.
Wolfish,'0 the Court reversed a lower court decision striking down
otherwise required by 'interests of the highest order,' soldiers as well as civilians are entitled
to follow the dictates of their faiths." Id. at 1322-23 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
6. The phrase "speech activities" is used intentionally to describe a range of conduct
much broader than that which Professor Emerson would protect. Much of his argument
that speech be accorded absolute protection depends on the existence of a clear line which
separates speech from action. T. EMERSON, supra note 1, at 17-19. For reasons better ex-
pressed by others, I disagree that that distinction either is or ought to be determinative, or
even particularly important, except as a factor in balancing the need to protect the communi-
cative activity against the resulting or potential harm. See, eg., L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CON-
STITUTIONAL LAW § 14-6 (2d ed. 1988); M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH,
§ 3.06 [A]-[C] (1984); Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case Study in the Roles of Categorization and
Balancing in First Amendment Analysis, 88 HARV. L. REv. 1482 (1975).
7. Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 844 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring) (first amendment
functionally and symbolically incompatible with military); Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 743-
44 (1974) (military not a deliberative body but is one whose law is obedience); Orloff v.
Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83, 94 (1953) ("The military constitutes a specialized community gov-
erned by a separate discipline from that of the civilian."). See generally Dienes, When the
First Amendment Is Not Preferred: The Military and Other "Special Contexts", 56 U. CIN. L.
REv. 779 (1988).
8. See G. STONE, L. SEIDMAN, C. SUNSTEIN & M. TUSHNET, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
931-38 (1986) (discussing various rationales underlying the first amendment).
9. See, e.g, O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 107 S. Ct. 2400 (1987) (possibility of security
risk basis for prohibiting certain religious practices by prisoners).
10. 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
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"conditions of confinement" in a short-term federal penal facility
which primarily housed pretrial detainees. Writing for the Court,
Justice Rehnquist stated:
[I]nternal order and discipline and.., institutional security...
"are peculiarly within the province and professional expertise of
corrections officials, and, in the absence of substantial evidence in
the record to indicate that the officials have exaggerated their
response to these considerations, courts should ... defer to their
expert judgment in such matters." . .. But judicial deference is
accorded not merely because the administrator ordinarily will, as
a matter of fact in a particular case, have a better grasp of his
domain than the reviewing judge, but also because the operation
of our correctional facilities is peculiarly the province of the Legis-
lative and Executive Branches of our government, not the
Judicial. 1 1
Just this past term in Turner v. Safley, l2 another prison regulation
case, 'Justice O'Connor noted:
[R]unning a prison is an inordinately difficult undertaking that
requires expertise, planning, and the commitment of resources,
all of which are peculiarly within the province of the Legislative
and Executive Branches of Government. Prison administration
is, moreover, a task that has been committed to the responsibility
of those branches, and separation ofpowers concerns counsel a pol-
icy of judicial restraint.1 3
The inteijection of non-justiciability language into an analytical
process which had previously focused solely on substantive first
amendment principles is significant. Even if the nature of a prison
system or the armed services requires that free speech values be ac-
commodated to the interests of discipline and order required to op-
erate these systems, both first amendment and separation of powers
theories require case-by-case judicial analysis of institutional poli-
cies measured against substantive constitutional norms.
If all that could be said of judicial deference in these cases is that
the Court is shirking its constitutional responsibility as principal ex-
positor of constitutional norms, that would be serious but hardly a
revelation. Commerce clause cases are replete with language of ju-
dicial deference.4 So are equal protection 5 and due process
11. Id. at 547-48 (quoting Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 827 (1974)) (emphasis added)
(footnotes and citations omitted). See also Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union,
433 U.S. 119, 137 (1977) (Burger, C.J., concurring) ("The federal courts ... are not equipped
to 'second guess' the decisions of state legislatures and administrators in this sensitive
area .... ").
12. 107 S. Ct. at 2254 (1987).
13. Id. at 2259 (emphasis added).
14. See, e.g., Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 537 (1985)
[Vol. 38:496
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cases.16 Indeed, the whole of "[c]onstitutional law is often an un-
easy mixture of substantive theory and institutional constraint. The
existence of institutional limits . . . forces the courts to limit the
scope of substantive constraints on government action. This combi-
nation sometimes produces doctrinal awkwardness, but it is hard to
think of an alternative."17 Professor Lawrence Sager even saw a
silver lining in judicial deference, suggesting that it "merely" cre-
ates a gap between the concept of a constitutional right and its con-
ception.I I fully agree that institutional or structural constraints on
judicial action are a part of constitutional life,19 however, I am not
convinced of their universal inevitability. More particularly, I find
the Court's recent use of separation of powers language in first
amendment cases, even cases which most obviously fall outside the
full protection of the first amendment, to be misplaced. The reason
is that the first amendment incorporates an institutional value found
in no other provision of the Bill of Rights.2" It is this institutional
value which suggests that separation of powers concerns, to the ex-
tent relevant at all in individual liberties cases, must stake out differ-
ent ground when applied to the first amendment.
II
A second look at the use of separation of powers theory to limit
the role of the judiciary in first amendment cases is necessary for
(deference to a Congressional decision to apply wage and hour laws to a state agency); Kat-
zenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 303-04 (1964) (deference to a Congressional decision
regarding the need to prohibit racial discrimination by interstate public facilities in order to
keep the lanes of commerce open).
15. E.g., San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 1, 40-44 (1973) (defer-
ence to state revenue raising authority and legislative expertise on tax policy); Korematsu v.
United States, 323 U.S. 214, 218 (1944) (deference to the political branches' war making
powers).
16. E.g., Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 321 (1982) (deference to expert determina-
tion regarding necessity of confinement and appropriate treatment); Kelly v. Johnson, 425
U.S. 238, 246-48 (1976) (length of policemen's hair a matter of institutional discretion).
17. Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 837, 912 (1987) (footnote omitted).
See also Komesar, Taking Institutions Seriously: Introduction to a Strategy for Constitutional
Analysis, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 366 (1984).
18. Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91
HARV. L. REV. 1212 (1978).
19. Durchslag, Constraints on Equal Access to Fundamental Liberties: Another Look at
Professor Michelman's Theory of Minimum Protection, 19 GA. L. REV. 1041, 1064 (1985);
Durchslag, Federalism and Constitutional Liberties: Varying the Remedy to Save the Right,
54 N.Y.U. L. REV. 723 (1979).
20. Throughout this paper I refer to the Bill of Rights to describe not only the first ten
amendments to the United States Constitution but more generally to describe any provision
of the United States Constitution which secures individual freedom.
1988]
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two reasons. First, free speech requires a compromise with estab-
lished order which no other provision of the Bill of Rights does. It
does so in two ways. Substantively it recognizes that even a funda-
mental alleration of the status quo is constitutionally acceptable.
And in a process sense, it protects the method by which that funda-
mental change can occur, public debate. The first amendment is, in
short, a blueprint for peaceful revolution."1 Justice Holmes' dissent
in Gitlow v. New York may best express this point: "[i]f in the long
run the beliefs expressed in proletarian dictatorship are destined to
be accepted by the dominant forces of the community, the only
meaning of free speech is that they should be given their chance and
have their way." 2 It is true that other constitutional rights (for
example procedural due process rights) can also be disruptive of the
status quo. The difference, however, is that in those instances pro-
tection is afforded despite the disruptive effects.23 We protect first
amendment rights because of their disruptive effect.2 4
Second, free speech has a constitutional value beyond that
which we attach to individual freedom or personal autonomy. We
protect free speech as much to preserve the process by which ideas
can be tested and change can occur as we do to protect an individ-
ual's right of self-fulfillment or to demonstrate our commitment to
limited government. Professor Owen Fiss recently highlighted the
21. Professor Robert Sedler describes this as the "dissent and social change" rationale of
the first amendment. Sedler, The First Amendment in Theory and Practice (Book Review),
80 YALE L.J. 1070, 1079-87 (1971) (reviewing T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF
EXPRESSION (1970)); cf F. SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY 10-12
(1982) (Speech is an "other-regarding act"-it is meant to have an impact on those
listening.).
22. 268 U.S. 652, 673 (1925) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
23. See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976) (balancing the nature
and extent of the individual's injury against the burdens on the government in order to deter-
mine how much process is due). See generally L. TRIaE, supra note 6, at §§ 10-12 to 10-19
(discussing what process is due).
24. Justice Brandeis might well have disagreed. Concurring in Whitney v. California,
Brandeis opined "that it is hazardous to discourage thought, hope and imagination; [and]
that fear breeds repression; that repression breeds hate; that hate menaces stable government;
that the path of safety lies in the opportunity to discuss freely... grievances and proposed
remedies ...." 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring). Brandeis might thus
have said that the first amendment, rather then being a disruptive factor, is a stabilizing
factor, providing a safety valve for political frustrations. Cf Blasi, The Pathological Perspec-
tive and the First Amendment, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 449, 452-53 (1985) ("The first task of any
system of constitutional limitations is to guarantee that the truly fundamental features of the
framework of government are maintained."). But see M. REDISH, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION
82 (1984) (criticizing the "safety valve" rationale); Redish, The Role of Pathology in First
Amendment Theory: A Skeptical Examination, 38 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 618 (1988) ("The
pathological perspective is theoretically flawed and potentially harmful to basic free speech
interests.").
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distinction between the individual autonomy and the public debate
aspects of the first amendment: "action is judged by its impact on
public debate ... rather than by whether it constrains or otherwise
interferes with the autonomy of some individual or institution."25
The question is whether individually or together these two distinc-
tions between first amendment and other claims of individual lib-
erty suggest a more limited role for a separation of powers concept
which limits judicial review.
A
For years scholars have debated the central meaning of the first
amendment. 26 But no matter what one's theory, certainly as a de-
scriptive matter it can be said that the paradigm free speech case
suggests a struggle. to balance order and disorder; the status quo
versus the forces of change. And speech, particularly political
speech, is the driving force of change. As Justice Brandeis so elo-
quently put it sixty years ago, "[t]hose who won our independence
by revolution were not cowards. They did not fear political change.
They did not exalt order at the cost of liberty."27 To that must be
added Justice Holmes' statements in Gitlow: "Every idea is an in-
citement. It offers itself for belief and if believed it is acted on un-
less some other belief outweighs it or some failure of energy stifles
the movement at its birth."'2 8
These are not simply words on a page. The criminal law does
not operate in the same way when first amendment values are at
stake as when they are not. A different balance between our desire
for order and our fears .of disorder is required. Thus the "clear and
present" danger test as interpreted in Brandenburg v. Ohio tells us
that we must compromise our fears of disorder, resulting from in-
citement to illegal action, in order to accommodate speech advocat-
ing revolution. 9 Scales v. United States ° and Noto v. United
25. Fiss, Why The State?, 100 HARV. L. REV. 781, 786 (1987).
26. L. BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SOCIETY (1986); A. MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH
AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT (1948); M. REDISH, supra note 24; F. SCHAUER,
supra note 21; Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. B. FOUND.
RES. J, 521; Schauer, The Role of the People in First Amendment Theory, 74 CALIF. L. REV.
761 (1986).
27. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
28. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 673 (1925) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
29. Brandenburg, 395 U.S. 444, 449 (1969) (The first amendment requires a distinction
between mere advocacy of unlawful action and incitement to imminent lawless action.).
30. 367 U.S. 203 (1961).
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States31 require a redefinition of basic notions of criminal conspir-
acy because of the first amendment's commitment to peaceful
change through political association. 32  And disorderly conduct
cannot be defined in a way which blames the speaker for the pre-
dictable reactions of the audience. 33  Thus the first amendment re-
quires us to tolerate much that we would not otherwise have to
tolerate.34 Government cannot prevent the ringing of our doorbells
by persons wishing to convince us of the value of their ideas and the
heresy of ours.35 Nor can it stop individuals or groups from demon-
strating outside our houses, saying things that we do not want to
hear.36 As long as some "worthwhile" message is projected, we
have to suffer even the most odious language, language considered
by some to be downright sinful.37 Even verbal threats and attempts
at intimidation at times may be protected as long as what is sought
is political change.38
I do not mean to overstate the point. The disorder and harm
tolerated by the first amendment is, given the possibilities, rather
narrowly defined. One cannot burn down the Soviet embassy de-
spite the message it might send about the plight of "Refuseniks" or
31. 367 U.S. 290 (1961).
32. In Noto, for example, the Court held that the government had to show "present
advocacy, and not an intent to advocate in the future or a conspiracy to advocate in the
future once a groundwork has been laid." Id.
33. Gregory v. Chicago, 394 U.S. 111 (1969) (Black, J., concurring) (leaders of a peace-
ful demonstration cannot be constitutionally convicted "simply because the form of their
protest had displeased some of the onlookers"); Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949)
(a statute which permitted convicting a person for breach of the peace if his speech" 'stirs the
public to anger, invites dispute, brings about a condition of unrest, or creates a disturbance'"
held unconstitutional).
34. Dean Bollinger points out the "disjunction" between our personal and constitutional
views regarding the limits of free speech. While we might object personally to being exposed
to certain ideas or means of expression, we object to the government's use of its coercive
powers to enforce those private views. L. BOLLINGER, supra note 26, at 12-39.
35. Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943) (statute forbidding knocking on
doors or ringing doorbells for the purpose of handbill distribution held invalid under first
amendment). See also City of Watseka v. Illinois Pub. Action Council, 796 F.2d 1547, 1550,
1559 (7th Cir. 1986), aff'd mem. 107 S. Ct. 919 (1987) (regulation of solicitation allowed only
if "in futherance of a legitimate governmental objective," and therefore prohibiting evening
and weekend soliciting was unconstitutional); Wisconsin Action Coalition v. City of Keno-
sha, 767 F.2d 1248, 1251 (7th Cir. 1985) (listing cases where the Supreme Court has granted
"substantial first amendment protection to door-to-door canvassing and soliciting activities").
36. Gregory, 394 U.S. 111; cf. Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415,
419-20 (1971) (leafletting in community of plaintiff's residence cannot be prohibited).
37. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (conviction for disturbing the peace by
wearing a jacket emblazoned with "fuck the draft" reversed).
38. NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 910 (1982) (boycott accom-
panied by threats protected by the first amendment).
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the Afghanistan affair. On the other hand, the degree of disorder
permitted should not be minimized. Claiborne Hardware teaches
that significant economic injury inflicted in order to put pressure on
a local political system is, as a matter of law, insufficient to justify
the imposition of tort damages.39
These examples, however, are part of what Professor Fiss de-
scribes as "The Free Speech Tradition," the use of the first amend-
ment "as a means of protecting the individual [street corner]
speaker from being silenced by the state."' None include disrup-
tion or disorder in social sectors, such as the military or prisons,
which fall outside Emerson's system of freedom of expression. In
those contexts either disruption is simply not an issue, as in com-
mercial speech, or the system itself cannot coexist with disruptive
speech.
But the issue is not whether the disorder created by any particu-
lar speech is tolerable or not. The question is who makes that deci-
sion. It is with respect to that decision that the Court has strayed.
Take, for example, the decision last term in Turner v. Safley4 1 in
which the Court, inter alia, upheld the Missouri Division of Correc-
tions' prohibition of mail correspondence between prisoners in dif-
ferent institutions unless they were immediate family members.
The question which the Court had to decide was whether the prison
had appropriately balanced its concerns for security with the first
amendment free speech rights of the prisoners. The Court did not
do that. Instead the Court came remarkably close to deciding it
does not possess the power to review the balance prison officials
drew between speech rights and the need for an orderly prison
environment.42
It is somewhat incongruous that in the face of a constitutional
provision which affirms the value of disorder, the Court would put
so much stock in an argument which relies on the disorder which
recognition of the right would create. It is almost baffling that the
Court would, in deciding how much disruption an institution can
tolerate, defer to the very institution which is alleging the
disruption.
Institutional restraints on judicial review are difficult enough to
accept in individual liberties cases which do not involve free speech
39. Id. at 920-21.
40. Fiss, Free Speech and Social Structure, 71 IowA L. REV. 1405, 1408 (1986).
41. 107 S. Ct. 2254 (1987).
42. Id. at 2259 ("Prison administration is ... a task that has been committed to the
[legislative and executive] branches ....").
1988)
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claims. But in first amendment cases, where disruption or disorder
is itself a constitutional value, the Court should not defer on the
question of how much disruption is tolerable. It is the responsibility
of the Court, not of the affected governmental body, to determine
whether the disruption, given the context in which it occurs, is a
constitutional "good" or a constitutional "bad." '4 3
B
Discussions about other provisions of the Bill of Rights are dis-
cussions about individual autonomy." The first amendment, how-
ever, speaks to institutional concerns as well.4 ' This is evident in
the Court's attempt to reconcile the sixth amendment's focus on an
individual's right to a public trial with the more general concern for
ensuring that our judicial system is fairly administered. In Gannett
Co. v. DePasquale,46 Justice Stewart recognized the public's interest
in a properly administered judicial system, but, in light of our ad-
versary system, held that that interest must be asserted by "the par-
ticipants in the litigation."'47 The four dissenting Justices disagreed
with Justice Stewart and would have found in the sixth amendment
a public right to an open trial distinct from that of the accused.48
Justice Powell agreed with the dissenters on the existence of the
public's right but he found it, not in the sixth, but in the first
43. 'Commentators have noted that persons whose major responsibility is to preserve
order are likely to undervalue free speech interests in the name of doing what they are em-
ployed to do. See Emerson, The Doctrine of Prior Restraint, 20 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB.
648, 658-59 (1955); Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 U. CHi. L. REV. 46, 74-75, 78
(1987). This tendency would be true not only with respect to the "censor" (a rare beast
today) but to a military base commander, a prison warden, and a high school principal as
well. Oddly, the Court recognized that in Turner v. Safley, but not with respect to the first
amendment claim. In addition to prohibiting inmate-to-inmate correspondence, the prison
also prohibited marriage among inmates. The reason for the latter regulation mirrored that
of the former-security. The Court held, however, that this regulation violated inmates'
rights to decide whether or not to marry. 107 S. Ct. at 2265. Moreover, it would appear
(although it is by no means clear) that the Court employed a higher standard of review in
assessing the "privacy" claim than it did in assessing the first amendment claim. Id. at 2263-
64. Like Justice Stevens, I find this aspect of the Court's opinion "puzzling." Id. at 2274.
44. Fiss, supra note 40, at 1413-14. ("Classical liberalism presupposes a sharp dichot-
omy between state and citizen. It teaches us to be wary of the state and equates liberty with
limited government."). See also F. SCHAUER, supra note 21, at 7-10, 60-72.
45. Fiss, supra note 40, at 1409-10. See also Stone, supra note 43, at 72-73 & n. 117.
46. 443 U.S. 368 (1979) (pretrial hearing may be closed to the public if the fairness of
the trial is threatened by unfavorable press or publicity).
47. Id. at 383.
48. Id. at 412 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (The sixth amendment reflects the fact "that a
trial is a 'public event' and [that courtroom activities] are 'public property.' " (quoting Craig
v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 374 (1947))).
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amendment.4 9 A year later in Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Vir-
ginia,5" Justice Powell's view was accepted by the Court; the pub-
lic's right found a resting place in the first amendment. The resting
place became a home just two years later in Globe Newspaper Co. v.
Superior Court:
[T]he right of access to criminal trials plays a particularly signifi-
cant role in the functioning of the judicial process and the gov-
ernment as a whole. Public scrutiny of a criminal trial enhances
the quality and safeguards the integrity of the factfinding process,
with benefits to both the defendant and to society as a whole.
Moreover, public access . . . fosters an appearance of fairness
thereby heightening public respect for the judicial process. And
in the broadest terms, public access to criminal trials permits the
public to participate in and serve as a check upon the judicial
process--an essential component in our structure of self-
government.5
1
The message of Richmond Newspapers and Globe Newspapers is
that an individual's desires regarding the publicity of his or her trial
and the views of that individual regarding whether that publicity is
likely to be helpful or harmful is subordinated to the interest in an
informed and open debate about the conduct of our judicial system.
Put another way, we measure the results in those cases not accord-
ing to an individual autonomy principle but rather according to a
structural principle which places political accountability at a higher
level than individual desire. More importantly, that institutional
principle is constitutional and derives from the same first amend-
ment which protects the autonomy principle.
Because we measure the Court's response to a first amendment
claim by a standard other than one based on individual autonomy,
is judicial abstention in the name of separation of powers less defen-
sible than when the only interest is one of individual autonomy? I
think the answer is yes for two reasons, both of which have some
foundation in process based concerns. First, Chief Justice Hughes'
statement in West Coast Hotel v. Parrish that "the liberty safe-
guarded [by the fourteenth amendment] is liberty in a social organi-
zation [to be free of] the evils which menace . . . the people"52
highlights the inevitable conflict between the right of the state to
govern and the right of an individual to be left to her own devices.
49. Id. at 397 (Powell, J., concurring).
50. 448 U.S. 555 (1980) (upholding the public's constitutional right under the first and
fourteenth amendments to attend criminal trials).
51. 457 U.S. 596, 602 (1982) (emphasis added) (state statute closing trials involving
sexual offenses against victims under the age of 18 held unconstitutional).
52. 300 U.S. 379, 391 (1937).
1988]
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The conflicts which arise in that context cannot all be resolved by
the judiciary, not because its time or expertise is limited, but be-
cause to do so would be to assume the quintessential task of govern-
ance, a task which requires that competing interests be weighed and
compromises be reached to accommodate those interests. And
whatever constitutional courts do, they do not, in that sense at least,
govern. Consequently, for the courts to enter the governance arena,
which they do whenever rationality review is abandoned for a
higher level of scrutiny, there must be a reason to do so, one which
relates to a failure or inability of a governing body to reach an ac-
ceptable resolution of competing interests or values. Not only must
we assume something about the governing body's abilities to resolve
the dispute, we also must assume that a court is more likely to reach
an acceptable result. Questions will therefore naturally arise re-
garding relative institutional competency. And those questions lead
to separation of powers analyses. 3
The same cannot be said when institutional interests are at
stake. To the extent that the first amendment guarantees society's
right to publicly debate its institutions, the conflict is not simply the
inevitable struggle between our desire to be free and our need to be
governed. Rather, the conflict is between the government's right to
govern and its obligation to submit itself to public scrutiny. In
other words, first amendment claims often implicate the legitimacy
of governance itself. A doctrine of separation of powers which re-
sults in a governing body determining the ground rules for discuss-
ing its own governance is a strange doctrine indeed.
The second reason for questioning judicial abstention in first
amendment cases is related to the first but focuses on a more gen-
eral concern for maintaining political accountability through public
debate. Those systems which we agree are outside Emerson's sys-
tem of free expression tend to be outside or on the perimeter of the
system of public accountability as well.54 Foreign service opera-
53. See, e.g., Regents of the Univ. of Michigan v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 226 (1985) (re-
view of decision preventing student from retaking an examination to qualify for accelerated
medical school program); Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981) (review of congressional
determination not to require women to register for the draft); Board of Curators of the Univ.
of Missouri v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78, 89-90 (1978) (review of academic dismissal decision);
cf San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 40-44 (1973) (review of state
educational financing scheme).
54. The exceptions would seem to be local educational systems. The actions of local
school boards and indeed those of local school administrators are often attended by signifi-
cant publicity and controversy. Thus public debate of local school decisions is more likely
than public debate of decisions by prison or military officials. Indeed it might not be too far
off the mark to suggest that the "real" reason the Hazelwood School District prohibited
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tions, particularly covert foreign service operations, as a practical
matter receive little legislative scrutiny unless something drastically
misfires. The prison system, at least that aspect which has been the
subject of first amendment litigation, is not ordinarily the subject of
legislative debate or I suspect even oversight by the elected execu-
tive. And the military's public posture results largely from an on-
going debate about funding priorities and, more recently, overseas
deployment. Rules regarding who is allowed to post what on base
bulletin boards5" or who can be singled out for exclusion from
otherwise public cocktail parties,56 and on what basis, rarely make
front page news, and, as a result, are rarely subject to political
scrutiny. 7
A separation of powers doctrine which suggests a barrier to ju-
dicial review only exacerbates the problem of political accountabil-
ity by ensuring that there is no forum in which to carry on the
public debate at any level. For unlike Rostker v. Goldberg58 or San
Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez,59 where concerns
about judicial intervention meant deference to the political
publication of a story about pregnancies among high school girls in the school's newspaper
was because of an anticipated adverse public reaction to such a story. Hazelwood School
Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 108 S. Ct. 562 (1988). Thus, it is tempting to say that the separation of
powers language, such as that which appears in the dissenting opinions in Board of Educ. v.
Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 891 (Burger, C.J., dissenting), 893-94 (Powell, J., dissenting), 921
(O'Connor, J., dissenting) (1982), and in Justice Black's dissent in Tinker v. Des Moines
Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 517 (1969) (Black, J., dissenting) is accepta-
ble. But I am not willing to say that, not without a great deal more thought. Suffice it to say
that separation of powers analysis may be less harmful in challenges to local school district
regulation than in challenges to military and prison regulations. The Court, however, has not
picked up on this argument; separation of powers language is rare in first amendment chal-
lenges to local school board regulations. See, eg., Hazelwood School Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 108
S. Ct. 562 (1988); Bethel School Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 106 S. Ct. 3159 (1986). In part the
reason for this may be that local school boards are politically accountable. The Court ap-
pears to defer to the judgment of military and prison officials in the same way and maybe for
the same reasons that it defers to the judgments of federal administrative agencies which
operate in arenas unfamiliar to the Court. See, eg., Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831-32
(1985) (failure of FDA to rule on acceptability of certain drugs used to execute prisoners by
lethal injection not matter for Court); FCC v. League of women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364,
376-77 n.l 1 (1984) (reluctance of the Court to abandon the "scarcity" rationale for broadcast
regulation without guidance from Congress or the FCC).
55. Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348, 350 n.2 (1980).
56. United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675 (1985).
57. One would have thought that the same could be said of Simcha Goldman's right to
wear a yarmulke while on duty. Congress evidently thought not, because the result in
Goldman v. Weinberger, 106 S. Ct. 1310 (1986) was altered by Congressional action. See
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1988 and 1989, Pub. L. No. 100-180,
101 Stat. 1019 (1987).
58. 453 U.S. 57 (1981).
59. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
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branches, similar concerns in O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz6° or
United States v. Albertini6 meant deference to the warden at New
Jersey's Leesberg State Prison or to the commanding officer at
Hickman Air Force Base.
Not only is this use of separation of powers contrary to the pub-
lic debate purposes of the first amendment, but it also runs counter
to what separation of powers is designed to promote. At the ex-
pense of over-simplification, separation of powers is a structural
concept which diffuses governing authority because "liberty is con-
stantly endangered by the tendency of men to abuse governmental
power and ... to prevent this abuse it is necessary to construct a
government in which power will check power."'6  To use a struc-
tural concept designed to diffuse governing authority in a way (1)
which concentrates it and (2) which concentrates it in the hands of
persons and governing institutions whose political accountability is
at best indirect, ignores not only the structural protections of the
first amendment but the liberty-securing benefits of separation of
powers as well.
III
It is easy to state the problem. It is far more difficult to assess its
significance. First, the use of separation of powers language in first
amendment cases to justify little or no judicial review appears to be
most prevalent when full constitutional protection would undoubt-
edly not be extended in any event.63 Second, even in those cases
60. 107 S. Ct. 2400 (1987).
61. 472 U.S. 675 (1985).
62. W. GWYNN, THE MEANING OF THE SEPARATION OF POWERS 101 (1965). See also
THE FEDERALIST No. 51 at 322-27 (J. Madison or A. Hamilton) (H.C. Lodge ed. 1902);
G. STONE, L. SEIDMAN, C. SUNSTEIN & M. TUSHNET, supra note 8, at 343-45; Strauss, The
Place ofAgencies in Government: Separation of Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L.
REV. 573, 603 (1984); cf Edgar & Schmidt, Curtis-Wright Comes Home: Executive Power
and National Security Secrecy, 21 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 349 (1986) (arguing for a greater
congressional role in national security policy-making).
63. Chief Justice Burger's concurring opinion in Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' La-
bor Union, 433 U.S. 119, 137 (1977) (Burger, C.J., concurring) was one of the early expres-
sions of concern over judicial intervention in first amendment cases outside the system of free
expression. Yet one year later, writing for the Court in Landmark Communications, Inc. v.
Virginia, 435 U.S. 829 (1978), he specifically rejected judicial deference to a legislative deter-
mination of clear and present danger: "the judicial function commands analysis of whether
... the legislation is consonant with the Constitution. Were it otherwise the scope of freedom
of speech and of the press would be subject to legislative definition and the function of the
First Amendment as a check on legislative power would be nullified." Id. at 844. The argu-
ment for deference to legislative determinations regarding the need to regulate speech traces
to early cases such as Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925) and Whitney v. California, 274
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where such language has appeared, the Court has not relied solely
on separation of powers concepts to resolve the issue; in each case in
which separation of powers language appears, language of judicial
balancing, albeit very limited balancing, also appears." Third, one
cannot describe the influence of separation of powers concerns by
looking at the results in individual cases. For example, in Turner v.
Safley,65 the Court used separation of powers language to outline
the basic principles which governed judicial review of prison regula-
tions and then reached a result seemingly inconsistent with its
stated principle of deference; it struck down a regulation prohibiting
prisoner marriages absent extraordinary circumstances.66 Finally,
it is difficult to argue that the effect of separation of powers theory
has been a lower standard of review than might otherwise apply in a
case where "fundamental rights" are at stake. Rational basis review
has become increasingly common when the Court believes that a
particular restriction has only minimal communicative impact.67
Does it matter, then, whether the Court (1) decides that separa-
tion of powers concerns prevent it from looking too closely, or even
at all, at certain decisions; or (2) decides that because the reasons
for protecting an unrestricted right of communication are weaker in
one context than another, the Court should look less closely at one
situation than another? I think the answer is yes for three reasons.
The first has to do with analytical integrity. The point here is be-
yond the old adage that "you have to ask the right question to get
the right answer," although that is undoubtedly important. Rather
the problem is one of language. If a claim is to be resolved on the
U.S. 357 (1927). However, it is now well accepted (and was before Landmark was decided)
that deference to such legislative determination is not warranted. See G. STONE, L. SEID-
MAN, C. SUINSTEIN & M. TUSHNET, supra note 8, at 979. In any event, the deference with
which this paper is concerned more resembles that which the Court pays to certain adminis-
trative agencies, because of a perceived lack ofjudicial expertise. See generally supra note 54.
64. See, eg., Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 507-08 (1986); Bell v. Wolfish, 441
U.S. 520, 545-46 (1979).
65. 107 S. Ct. 2254 (1987).
66. Id. at 2265-66.
67. Stone, supra note 43, at 78-79. Dean Stone does not suggest a high level of scrutiny
for all content-neutral restrictions, only that the Court demonstrate greater sensitivity to the
impact of content-neutral restrictions particularly on non-traditional methods of communica-
tion. See, eg., Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984) (camp-
ing in Lafayette Park to demonstrate the plight of the homeless). In cases falling outside the
system of free expression, however, the Court seems unconcerned whether the-regulation,
either on its face or in its application, is content-neutral or content-specific. See, e.g., Turner
v. Safley, 107 S. Ct. 2254 (1987) (content-neutral); Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733 (1974)
(content-specific); cf Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 518 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing) (wearing other identification of religious preference and ethnic identity permitted, thus
making regulation content-specific).
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basis of the first amendment, the Court will (hopefully) use the lan-
guage of the first amendment in its analysis. Similarly, if the Court
believes the issue to be non-justiciable it will (or should) make that
clear in language appropriate to describing the limits of its Article
III prerogatives. Unfortunately, the Court has sometimes thought
judicial abstention, but said first amendment. For example, in
United States v. Albertini68 the Court gives the third part of the so-
called O'Brien test, which requires that the "restriction on alleged
First Amendment freedoms [be] no greater than is essential to the
furtherance of [the government's] interest,"69 a meaning which the
language does not convey; "essential" means that the government is
better off with this regulation than with no regulation at all.7"
Translated into plain English, the Court held that the first amend-
ment has no application, or no judicially enforceable application, to
regulations governing military property or military personnel be-
yond that of the fifth amendment's due process clause.
Second, the nature of the question determines the topic of con-
versation. And the Court has apparently shifted the topic of con-
versation in cases outside the system of free expression. The Court
no longer seriously discusses whether the speech activity threatens
the mission of the particular governmental institution. The dissent
in Turner v. Safley correctly says that the topic of conversation is
now whether anything can be said in support of the particular re-
striction, regardless of supporting evidence in the record.7' As any
experienced negotiator will attest, the conversation's topic often, if
not always, determines the outcome.72
Third, and I suspect most important, to the extent that separa-
tion of powers concerns have produced a shift in the focus of the
discussion, those concerns have denied the very thing which the
first amendment has been interpreted to promote-public debate.73
Professor Emerson correctly tells us that sometimes we must lose
some ideas to the marketplace because of the institutional context in
which they are asserted. Captain Levy may not be able to express
68. 472 U.S. 675 (1985).
69. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968).
70. Albertini, 472 U.S. at 689.
71. Turner, 107 S. Ct. at 2270-73 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
72. See Danzig, How Questions Begot Answers in Felix Frankfurter's First Flag Salute
Opinion, 1977 Sup. CT. REV. 257. Weisberg, How Judges Speak.- Some Lessons on Adjudica-
tion in Billy Budd, Sailor With an Application to Justice Rehnquist, 57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 42-
58 (1982).
73. See notes 44-51 and accompanying text.
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his views on war to enlisted men at Fort Jackson; 74 nor may
Mathew Fraser use sexual allusions when speaking in favor of a
high school classmate for class office,75 but it is not apparent why
we must also lose the ability to publicly debate the receptivity of
those institutions to diverse views.
The cure is simple; "go back to the good old days." While sepa-
ration of powers language has appeared periodically in "ordinary"
first amendment cases, 76 in recent years it has largely been limited
to cases in which the nation's foreign policy interests were impli-
cated.7 7 And while that too may be arguable, foreign policy is an
area from which the Court has shied irrespective of the claim as-
serted.78 Outside the foreign policy arena, language of separation of
powers is of recent vintage. There is no such language in earlier
military cases like Parker v. LeVy 7 9 and Brown v. Glines8° or, in
earlier prison discipline cases like Procunier v. Martinez81 and Pell
v. Procunier.82 These earlier cases demonstrate that the Court is
capable of evaluating the impact of first amendment claims on insu-
lar governmental institutions such as the military and is capable of
resolving those claims on their merits without disrupting the institu-
tions with respect to which the claims are made. In short, sugges-
tions that the Court must bow to the expertise of military, prison,
education or park service employees about the degree of acceptable
disruption is at best over-stated and at worst simple nonsense.
74. Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733 (1974).
75. Bethel School Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 106 S. Ct. 3159 (1986).
76. See supra note 63.
77. See, eg., New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 752-59 (1971)
(Harlan, J., dissenting) (only question for Court was whether appropriate executive branch
official made the decision).
78. See, eg., Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S. 222 (1984) (currency regulation which effectively
prohibited travel to Cuba); Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981) (right of President
to enter into agreement with foreign nation prohibiting claims of United States creditors
against foreign assets); Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 81-84 (1976) (judicial deference to
Congressional judgment regarding eligibility of aliens for Medicare supplemental insurance).
79. 417 U.S. 733 (1974).
80. 444 U.S. 348 (1980).
81. 416 U.S. 396 (1974).
82. 417 U.S. 817 (1974).
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